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THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Scott A. Boykin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s and 1960s, J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (“FBI”) engaged in illegal and abusive surveillance and intimidation 
of political dissidents and civil rights activists,1 and in the wake of that gov-
ernment misconduct, Congress adopted the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (“FISA”) to assert congressional and judicial oversight of execu-
tive branch agencies’ intelligence-gathering activities.2 There was a dramatic 
increase in requests for surveillance under FISA after the September 11, 
2001 terror attacks,3 and Congress amended FISA to enhance the govern-
ment’s authority to conduct such surveillance in response to those attacks.4 
When Congress discovered in the mid-2000s that the FBI and National Se-
curity Agency (“NSA”) had overstepped their authority to conduct electron-
ic intelligence with the Bush administration’s blessing, Congress amended 
FISA again to permit the government to continue what had been illegal con-
duct.5 Beginning in 2013, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden dis-
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 1. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 2–18 (1976), http:// 
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf. 
 2. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978), http:// 
www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_Act/HPSCI_  
FISA_Report_95-1283_Pt.1.pdf. 
 3. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2014, ELEC. PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited March 11, 
2016) [hereinafter FISA Ct. Orders 1979–2014] (summarizing United States Department of 
Justice annual FISA reports to Congress). 
 4. SENATE COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, TO PERMANENTLY AUTHORIZE CERTAIN 
PROVISIONS OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE 
TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM (USA PATRIOT) ACT OF 2001, 
TO REAUTHORIZE A PROVISION OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION 
ACT OF 2004, TO CLARIFY CERTAIN DEFINITIONS IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIVE TOOLS NECESSARY TO 
PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY, S. REP. NO. 109-85, at 1–2 (2005), http://www.intelli
gence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10985.pdf. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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closed documents to the public that showed the surprising magnitude of 
governmental surveillance and collection of information regarding cell 
phone and internet communications of Americans, which prompted calls for 
reform.6 The reform, the USA FREEDOM Act, became effective in Novem-
ber, 2015, and while it is an improvement in the law, it does not represent a 
great change in the access to information the government has had for more 
than a decade.7 
What is more, the recent amendments make relatively minor changes to 
the FISA Court and the FISA Court of Review, established by the original 
FISA statute in 1978 to consider applications for electronic surveillance 
under the statute.8 These courts are unlike any others in the history of the 
United States.9 The judges of these courts are selected by the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States.10 Although they are United States 
District judges or United States Court of Appeals judges, there is no con-
gressional involvement in their appointment to these courts.11 Their orders 
are mostly secret, and their proceedings are largely secret.12 With rare ex-
ceptions, the only parties to appear before these courts are the federal agen-
cies seeking orders to permit them to gather information about subjects for 
investigation.13 Their proceedings are generally not adversarial in nature.14 
The federal government appears before them to obtain approval for searches 
without objection.15 These courts are developing a body of secret law.16 
They have developed precedent that no lawyer can research, understand, and 
criticize because it is secret law.17 While there is a FISA Court of Review, 
no higher court has ever examined a decision of the FISA Court on appeal. 
The FISA Court has approved thousands of requests for surveillance and 
modified only a small handful of such requests.18 While the USA 
FREEDOM Act adopts some meaningful changes to these courts’ proce-
dures, the statute does not make these courts the check on executive power 
 
 6. H. JUDICIARY COMM., UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY FULFILLING 
RIGHTS AND ENSURING EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE OVER MONITORING ACT OF 2015, H.R. REP. NO. 
114-100, at 2–3 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/114th-congress/hou
se-report/109/1. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III. 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III. 
 13. See discussion infra Part III. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III. 
 15. See discussion infra Part III. 
 16. See discussion infra Part III. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. 
 18. See FISA Ct. Orders 1979–2014, supra note 3. 
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that FISA’s authors envisioned.19 Rather, the FISA Court’s structure and 
limited review of applications for surveillance impose a very weak limita-
tion on executive branch power.20 Ironically, FISA has contributed to the 
concentration of power in the executive branch and to the deterioration of 
the separation of powers, which is a core principle of American govern-
ment.21 
In the second part of this article, I detail the provisions and historical 
development of FISA, which is a narrative of largely unsuccessful efforts to 
monitor and limit executive branch agencies’ intelligence-gathering activi-
ties. In the third part, I discuss the FISA courts, including their authority, 
structure, and procedures. These courts, I argue, have very limited control 
over the executive branch’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering pro-
grams and thus offer a limited check on executive branch power. In the final 
section, I discuss the separation of powers principle in the American politi-
cal system and how FISA has contributed to a decades-long trend of increas-
ing concentration of power in the executive branch. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FISA 
Congress adopted FISA to impose judicial control over the executive 
branch’s surveillance activities.22 The statute was not often used until after 
the September 11, 2001 terror attacks,23 which underscored the need for 
more effective surveillance and intelligence-gathering techniques to prevent 
additional attacks. Congress responded by amending FISA to broaden the 
freedom of executive branch agencies to conduct surveillance and gather 
electronic intelligence with relatively little judicial supervision.24 In fact, as I 
show in the following sections, when Congress learned that the executive 
branch had violated FISA, Congress amended FISA to allow the executive 
branch to engage in previously-illegal activities.25 When the American pub-
lic became aware of the extent of the federal government’s surveillance ac-
 
 19. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 20. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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tivities in 2013, public demands for reform produced further amendments 
that do little to roll back the broad and largely unchecked intelligence-
gathering and surveillance powers Congress authorized before.26 
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
In December 1974, New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh dis-
closed to the public that the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) had been 
engaged in intelligence operations against American citizens and had taken 
part in acts designed to destabilize foreign governments.27 The public alarm 
over these activities prompted the United States Senate to establish a special 
committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, to investigate the govern-
ment’s activities.28 Over a nine-month period, the committee interviewed 
hundreds of witnesses and conducted numerous hearings, ultimately produc-
ing analysis demonstrating that the FBI had engaged in illegal covert opera-
tions in the United States and that the CIA had engaged in illegal covert 
operations at home and abroad.29 For example, the Committee’s reports 
demonstrated that the FBI and CIA had harassed civil rights and political 
dissident groups, opened and read individuals’ mail, and conducted warrant-
less break-ins to plant surveillance devices and steal information regarding 
the groups’ members.30 The “Church Committee,” as it became known, is 
the forerunner to the present-day Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
charged with congressional oversight of executive branch intelligence ac-
tivities, including intelligence agency reports, budgets, programs, and ac-
tions.31 
As a result of the Church Committee’s findings, Congress adopted the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978.32 Under the statute as origi-
nally adopted, the President could authorize electronic surveillance of for-
eign powers to gather intelligence upon the Attorney General’s certification 
that there was no “substantial likelihood” that the government would obtain 
the communications of a “United States person” (a citizen or other lawful 
resident of the United States) and that the minimization procedures for the 
 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 27. Church Committee Created, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/Church_Committee_Created.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 10–13 (1976), 
https://archive.org/stream/finalreportofsel03unit/finalreportofsel03unit_djvu.txt. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Christopher P. Banks, Protecting (or Destroying) Freedom Through Law: The USA 
PATRIOT Act’s Constitutional Implications, in AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 34 (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds., 2004). 
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surveillance protected the private information of United States persons.33 
The FISA Court, created by the statute, could issue orders for electronic 
surveillance of foreign powers or their agents upon application by federal 
officers authorized by the Attorney General on behalf of the President.34 A 
United States person could not be regarded as a foreign power for purposes 
of obtaining an order from the FISA Court for activities protected by the 
First Amendment.35 Nevertheless, a United States person could be an agent 
of a foreign power when the person engages in clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities on a foreign power’s behalf, when such activities may involve a vio-
lation of the criminal laws of the United States, when a person engages or 
prepares to engage in sabotage or international terrorism on behalf of a for-
eign power, when a person enters the United States under a false identity on 
behalf of a foreign power, or when a person aids or abets or conspires to do 
any of the foregoing.36 
Under FISA, the location of the surveillance must be a place that is to 
be used by a foreign power or its agent.37 The minimization procedures had 
to meet the same requirement as for electronic surveillance without a court 
order.38 Further, the order had to specify the target and location for the sur-
veillance, the method of conducting the surveillance, the duration of the 
surveillance, and the number of devices employed to conduct the surveil-
lance and order that the minimization procedures be followed.39 The USA 
PATRIOT Act made profound changes to FISA and gave broad new powers 
to the executive branch to conduct surveillance activities with relatively 
little oversight from the judiciary. 
B. The USA PATRIOT Act 
After the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States, Con-
gress adopted the USA PATRIOT Act, and Title II of the new law amended 
 
 33. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 787, §§ 
102(a)(1), 101(h) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f)(1)–(4), 1802(a)(1)(A)(i)) 
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 114-95 and 114-113) 
approved 2015). 
 34. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (West, current through P.L. 114-115 (excluding 114-94 and 
114-95) approved 12-28-2015). 
 35. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw). 
 36. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 
114-94, 114-95 and 114-113) approved 2015). 
 37. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(3)(B) (Westlaw). 
 38. See id. § 105(a)(4). 
 39. See id. § 105(b). If the target was a foreign power, FISA did not require the order to 
specify the type of information or the method and number of devices to be used for the sur-
veillance. See id. § 105(c). 
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the FISA statute.40 An application for an order allowing electronic surveil-
lance under FISA requires a statement of a federal officer under oath attest-
ing to the identity or description of a proposed target for surveillance, a 
statement of the “facts and circumstances” showing that the target is “being 
used or is about to be used” by “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power,” a description of the communications sought and the types of com-
munications being sought, and “that a significant purpose of the surveillance 
is to obtain foreign intelligence information” that cannot be obtained by 
ordinary intelligence-gathering techniques.41 “Foreign intelligence infor-
mation” is information limited to that needed to protect the United States 
against hostile acts, terrorism, or intelligence operations directed against the 
United States by a foreign power or its agent.42 A judge must find that there 
is probable cause showing that the target of the surveillance is a foreign 
power or its agent and that the facilities targeted are being used or are about 
to be used by a foreign power or its agent.43 In determining whether the re-
quired probable cause exists, a judge may consider “past activities of the 
target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future activi-
ties of the target.”44 
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, “[m]inimization procedures” are those 
adopted by the Attorney General intended to “minimize the acquisition and 
retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available infor-
mation concerning unconsenting United States persons” in the acquisition 
and use of foreign intelligence information, “unless such person’s identity is 
necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its im-
portance.”45 Nonetheless, such information may be retained and used for 
general law enforcement purposes or if the Attorney General concludes that 
the “information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any 
person.”46 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to allow for the 
acquisition of business records of United States businesses in a way that 
permitted wholesale collection of databases containing records of electronic 
 
 40. “USA PATRIOT” is an acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” See USA 
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 56-107, § 1(a), 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2011). 
 41. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2010). Before the USA PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA 
were adopted in 2001, the “primary purpose” of surveillance had to be to gather foreign intel-
ligence. See USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 218. But cf. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 50 
U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(b)(7). 
 42. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-
94, 114-95 and 114-113) approved 2015). 
 43. Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A). 
 44. Id. § 1805(b). 
 45. Id. § 1801(h)(1)–(2). 
 46. Id. § 1801(h)(3)–(4). 
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communications that occurred wholly within the United States.47 FISA now 
authorizes the FBI to apply for an order “requiring the production of any 
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not 
concerning a United States person or to protect against international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities.”48 The application for records has 
to show “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things 
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat as-
sessment) . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a 
United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandes-
tine intelligence activities . . . .”49 There is a presumption that the things, or 
items, sought are relevant if related to a foreign power or its agent, or per-
sons in contact with or known to such agents.50 In addition, the application 
must set forth the minimization procedures regarding the dissemination and 
retention of information regarding United States persons.51 The only sub-
stantive limitation on the records sought is that the investigation to which 
they are relevant is not being conducted on “a United States person solely 
upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”52 Under the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA 
thus permits the government to obtain information records of electronic 
communications that occur wholly within the United States provided these 
are included in the records obtained to target persons located overseas. 
Not only did the USA PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA permit 
wholesale acquisition of databases of electronic communications in princi-
ple, the government used FISA to obtain massive amounts of such records in 
fact, and it was the disclosure of these practices by former NSA contractor 
Edward Snowden that brought these practices to the public’s attention.53 On 
April 25, 2013, the FISA Court ordered Verizon Business Network Services 
to provide to the FBI “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created 
by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad, or 
(ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”54 The 
 
 47. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-115 (excluding 114-95) 
approved 2015). 
 48. Id. § 1861(a)(1). 
 49. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(B). 
 50. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
 51. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(D). 
 52. Id. § 1861(a)(2)(B). 
 53. Garance Franke-Ruta, Meet Edward Snowden, the NSA Whistleblower: He’s in His 
20s, He Votes Third Party, and He’s Holed up in Hong Kong, THE ATLANTIC (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/meet-edward-snowden-the-nsa-
whistleblower/276688/. 
 54. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., on Behalf of 
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order required Verizon to produce the records for a period of three months.55 
FISA thus authorizes the government to obtain records of communications 
between persons located in the United States, provided they are contained 
within records deemed relevant to an “investigation to obtain foreign intelli-
gence information not concerning a United States person or to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”56 The 
government could now obtain information regarding the communications of 
United States persons without any showing that the persons whose records 
are obtained are engaged in any sort of criminal activity or any activity hos-
tile in any way to the United States. 
Judicial review of such requests was highly circumscribed. The judge 
was required to approve the application upon finding that it satisfied the 
relevance, minimization, and First Amendment requirements of § 1861.57 
The recipient of an order to produce under § 1861 could challenge the order, 
but the FISA Court would grant the petition “only if the judge finds that 
such order does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise 
unlawful.”58 Recipients of orders under § 1861 may not disclose the order.59 
The recipient may challenge the nondisclosure provisions of an order, and 
the court may grant a petition to set aside or modify the nondisclosure provi-
sion on a showing that “there is no reason to believe that disclosure may 
endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplo-
matic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.”60 
Thus, for example, data providers Microsoft, Inc.61 and Google, Inc.62 peti-
tioned the FISA Court to authorize disclosing aggregate data concerning 
government requests to the companies, which remain pending before the 
FISA Court. Provider Yahoo!, Inc. petitioned the court to publish its opinion 
and the briefs submitted in its challenge to an order to Yahoo! to produce 
 
MCI Communications Services, Inc., d/b/a Verizon Business Services, No. BR 13-80, at 2 
(FISA Ct. 2013), https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf. 
 55. See id. at 4. 
 56. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). 
 57. See id. § 1861(c)(1). 
 58. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(B). 
 59. Id. § 1861(d). 
 60. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(C). 
 61. In re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. MISC. 13-04 
(FISA Ct. 2013). 
 62. In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment Regarding Google, Inc.’s First Amendment 
Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, No. MISC. 13-03 (FISA Ct. 
2013). 
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issued by the FISA Court,63 which the court rejected. The FISA Court of 
Review affirmed the decision.64 
Other important amendments to FISA effected by the USA PATRIOT 
Act significantly increased the government’s ability to conduct electronic 
surveillance. These include a provision authorizing roving wiretaps “in cir-
cumstances where the Court finds, based upon specific facts provided in the 
application, that the actions of the target of the application may have the 
effect of thwarting the identification of a specified person, such other per-
sons . . . .”65 In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to author-
ize the government to seek court orders authorizing the “installation and use 
of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain for-
eign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to 
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties.”66 Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized information obtained 
through FISA to be used for ordinary criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions provided that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain 
foreign surveillance information, where formerly FISA had required that 
“the purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain such information.67 
The government’s ability to use information obtained via FISA for 
criminal prosecutions has proved controversial. The NSA shares information 
it obtains through FISA requests approved by the FISA Court with other 
agencies engaged in ordinary law enforcement activities, such as the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).68 What is more, the DEA instructs 
agents to conceal the source of information it obtains from the NSA by 
“parallel constructions” of its investigations so that no one, including crimi-
nal defendants, will learn the source of information used in the investiga-
tions.69 A parallel construction of an investigation is a false account of the 
source of the information used in an investigation, created so that no one 
may discover the true source of the information used to conduct the investi-
gation.70 
 
 63. In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc., Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, No. 08-01, 2008 WL 10632524 (FISA Ct. 2008). 
 64. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
 65. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 
114-94, 114-95 and 114-113) approved 2015). 
 66. Id. § 1842(a)(2). 
 67. See id. §§ 1804(a), 1823(a). 
 68. Brian Fung, The NSA Is Giving Your Phone Records to the DEA. And the DEA Is 
Covering It up, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/08/05/the-nsa-is-giving-your-phone-records-to-the-dea-and-the-dea-is-
covering-it-up/. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
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In In re Sealed Case, the FISA Court of Review considered whether 
FISA’s requirement that only a “significant purpose” of a FISA request be 
related to obtaining foreign intelligence information complies with the rea-
sonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.71 In that decision, one 
of only a small number released to the public, the court held that the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s amendments to FISA were intended to enable the govern-
ment to obtain foreign intelligence information for ordinary law enforce-
ment purposes, provided that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance is to 
obtain foreign intelligence.72 The court was troubled by the PATRIOT Act’s 
amendments to FISA, which made clear that there is, in fact, a distinction to 
be made between foreign intelligence and law enforcement investigation.73 
This distinction arises from the provision that a “significant purpose” of a 
surveillance order under FISA must be to gather foreign intelligence, which 
implies that there may be other statutorily permissible purposes other than 
foreign intelligence gathering for FISA requests.74 The court concluded that 
national security is such a weighty governmental interest that the FISA or-
ders do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement for 
searches.75 Thus, the government may use information obtained via FISA 
orders for ordinary law enforcement purposes unrelated to national security. 
The FISA procedures are strikingly more lenient than those required 
for a federal wiretap under the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act 
of 1968 (“Omnibus Act”).76 The Omnibus Act procedures require the gov-
ernment to provide a statement under oath of the facts and circumstances 
showing that a crime is being or is about to be committed, a description of 
the facilities from which electronic communications will be intercepted, a 
statement why other investigative techniques have failed or will fail to ena-
ble the government to obtain the information sought, and a statement of the 
length of time for which the information obtained will be kept by the gov-
ernment.77 To obtain an order permitting a wiretap, the judge must find that 
there is probable cause that the purported offense is being committed or will 
be committed and that the wiretap will disclose information regarding the 
offense.78 
Under FISA, there is no requirement of probable cause that the surveil-
lance will disclose evidence of a crime, or even of any sort of violent or hos-
 
 71. 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
 72. Id. at 723. 
 73. See id. at 724–25. 
 74. See id. at 729. 
 75. See id. at 744. 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 
114-95 and 114-113) approved 2015). 
 77. See id. § 2518(1). 
 78. See id. § 2518(3). 
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tile activity. In addition to such acts, definitions of “foreign intelligence in-
formation” include attack, sabotage, international terrorism, or the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction.79 Other covered acts, however, need 
not be hostile to the United States nor, indeed, hostile toward anyone.80 
“Foreign intelligence information” includes “clandestine intelligence activi-
ties by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent 
of a foreign power” and “information with respect to a foreign power or 
foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is 
necessary to the national defense or the security of the United States; or the 
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”81Although the USA 
PATRIOT Act greatly strengthened the government’s ability to conduct 
electronic surveillance, there were still more changes to come. 
C. The USA FREEDOM Act  
Americans became aware of the extent of the data collection and sur-
veillance being conducted under FISA through the media disclosures of 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, and as public criticism of the 
government’s conduct mounted, Congress members considered ways to 
amend the statute to address these criticisms. Congress adopted the USA 
FREEDOM Act82 on June 2, 2015, within days of the expiration of the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s provisions regarding electronic surveillance, almost all of 
which were thereby renewed through 2019. This is a bill that had originally 
been introduced in Congress following the revelations about the federal 
government’s surveillance activities by whistleblower Eric Snowden.83 Its 
ostensible purpose is to reign in the collection and surveillance of Ameri-
cans’ communications.84 Its chief effect is to end the government’s ability to 
collect and maintain in its possession information about persons’ communi-
cations in its own databases, but it does very little to limit the government’s 
ability to search the databases of private companies that possess such infor-
mation. Of particular interest here is the limited changes the law imposes on 
the courts’ ability to monitor the executive branch’s activities. 
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Under the new law, to obtain information from communications pro-
viders, the government must offer a “specific selection term” to be used in 
searching call detail records, which are communications metadata.85 The 
requirement of a “specific selection term” is important because its intention 
is to end the bulk collection of data under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.86 In fact, Sections 103 and 501 of the USA FREEDOM Act 
prohibit bulk collection of data for business records and national security 
letter collection, respectively. The NSA has announced that it will cease 
accessing data collected under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act on 
November 29, 2015, 180 days after the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, 
but will maintain the data as long as it has litigation obligations related to 
the data.87 
In order to obtain such information from a communications provider 
under the USA FREEDOM Act amendments to FISA, the government must 
show: 
(1) reasonable grounds to believe that the call detail records are relevant 
to such investigation; and (2) a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
specific selection term is associated with a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in prepara-
tion for such terrorism.
88
 
It is important to note that the government need only show that its specific 
selection term used to obtain call detail records is relevant to an investiga-
tion of international terrorism. There is no requirement that there be any 
connection between an individual’s communication and any potential terror-
ist activity. It is only the specific selection term itself that has the higher 
requirement of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a connection with ter-
rorism. There is a world of difference between these two because there is no 
requirement of a reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause, to relate a 
search of a person’s communications with terrorist activity. 
As before, the role of the courts is limited. The court must determine 
that the search is limited in duration, that the search term is acceptable under 
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the statute, and that acceptable minimization procedures are observed.89 The 
judge must limit the production period for call records under a request to 
180 days and limit the request to two “hops,” i.e., an initial request and a 
second request based on information disclosed by the first request for call 
detail records, and the court must “adopt minimization procedures that re-
quire the prompt destruction of all call detail records produced under the 
order that the Government determines are not foreign intelligence infor-
mation.”90 This is not a significant change, in terms of judicial review, over 
the previous statute. Section 103 of the statute requires courts to include a 
“specific selection term to be used as the basis for the tangible things 
sought,” and section 104 requires a FISA court to find that the minimization 
procedures submitted with the application meet applicable FISA standards.91 
The USA FREEDOM Act attempts, in a weak way, to address the ab-
sence of adversarial proceedings in the FISA courts. Section 401 of the stat-
ute directs the presiding judges of the FISA Court and the FISA Court of 
Review to jointly designate at least five individuals to serve as amicus curi-
ae to assist in the consideration of any application for an order or review that 
presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, and it “permits FISA 
courts to appoint an individual or organization to serve as amicus curiae in 
other instances, including to provide technical expertise.”92 
Section 402 of the USA FREEDOM Act requires the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence and the Attorney General to act as follows: 
[C]onduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion 
issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in section 601(e)) 
that includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision 
of law, including any novel or significant construction or interpretation 
of the term ‘specific selection term’, and, consistent with that review, 
make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each such deci-
sion, order, or opinion.
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That section also authorizes the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Attorney General to issue such decisions in redacted form or to waive the 
requirement to declassify such decisions if doing so is “necessary to protect 
the national security of the United States or properly classified intelligence 
sources or methods.”94 The requirement to consider declassifying the FISA 
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Courts’ decisions is an effort to reduce the problem of secret law under 
FISA. Note, however, that the USA FREEDOM Act places this decision 
firmly in the hands of the executive branch. 
The USA FREEDOM Act is an improvement over the unamended 
FISA statute, but it is not a great improvement. While it does not authorize 
the federal government to engage in bulk collection of data and to continue 
to maintain databases of information of persons’ communications, it contin-
ues the practice of permitting the government to search the information of 
any person’s communications based upon the search selection term em-
ployed. Judicial review of these searches remains limited. The court must 
consider only the search selection term, whether the search contents are 
metadata, and the minimization procedures used to limit the exposure of the 
information obtained. None of these requirements approach the individual-
ized inquiry characteristic of a judicially-authorized search. Instead, they 
resemble more closely the administrative review of executive action under a 
highly deferent standard. Furthermore, the efforts to reform the FISA Court 
and FISA Court of Review grant the Director of National Intelligence and 
the Attorney General broad discretion to maintain the secrecy of the courts’ 
opinions provided that, in their judgment, maintaining their secrecy is nec-
essary to national security. This does not address the problem of concentrat-
ed power in the executive branch. The appointment of amici curiae by the 
FISA courts to advocate for civil liberties is better than the one-sided pro-
ceedings that have predominated in these courts, but it does not establish a 
norm of adversarial proceedings in which a private party facing governmen-
tal coercion has a powerful incentive to litigate vigorously on behalf of their 
own interests.95 
D. Unlawful Surveillance Activities and FISA Amendments 
Congress and the Bush administration intended the USA PATRIOT 
Act to strengthen the nation’s ability to combat terrorism after the 9/11 at-
tacks on the United States.96 The Bush administration was convinced that it 
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needed to avoid FISA’s requirements that it obtain judicial approval for sur-
veillance activities, so it devised and implemented the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP) in the mid-2000s.97 The TSP consisted of warrantless sur-
veillance on persons the Bush administration suspected might be involved in 
terrorist activities.98 Under the TSP beginning in 2001 the government inter-
cepted international phone calls,99 and the NSA’s STELLARWIND program 
mined information from email databases and gathered telephone metadata 
from the databases of cell phone service providers.100 The NSA also gath-
ered and analyzed the content of telephone conversations and email com-
munications from these databases,101 and, from the beginning of the TSP 
through January 2007, eight percent of the communications analyzed were 
those of United States persons.102 
The Bush administration did not inform the FISA Court or Congress 
about the TSP. Instead, the public learned about the TSP when the admin-
istration’s warrantless searches were leaked to the New York Times in 
2005.103 The administration’s surveillance activities violated FISA because 
the government had failed to follow the procedures outlined in the statute 
for obtaining judicial approval for its surveillance and failed to submit the 
reports to Congress required by FISA and the National Security Act of 
1947.104 Nonetheless, the Bush administration argued that Congress had 
approved its conduct in the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) in 
Afghanistan that Congress adopted following the 9/11 terror attacks.105 The 
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administration reasoned that since the AUMF authorized the President to 
use all necessary force to defeat the nation’s enemies responsible for the 
9/11 attacks, the government had thereby been authorized to conduct sur-
veillance activities it found useful for combating terrorism and was not 
bound by FISA’s requirements in doing so.106 Thus, for example, on March 
11, 2004, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez certified the President’s 
authorization to continue the TSP (PSP) because Attorney General John 
Ashcroft had refused to certify it, and the authorization “explicitly asserted 
that the President’s exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief authority 
displaced any contrary provisions of law, including FISA.”107 
No sanctions of any kind were meted out to Bush administration offi-
cials by Congress or the courts for their disregard of FISA. Instead, in 2007, 
Congress adopted the Protect America Act (PAA), which essentially adopt-
ed the Bush administration’s TSP.108 The PAA had a short lifespan, but 
Congress amended FISA in 2008 in ways that adopted the PAA program, 
and thus also the TSP program that the Bush administration had used to 
avoid FISA for several years.109 It was under this version of FISA that the 
government was empowered to engage in fishing expeditions through mas-
sive databases of information, and through discovery orders it was author-
ized via FISA to submit to telecommunications companies and internet ser-
vice providers. The FISA statute, originally intended to impose checks on 
the ability of the executive branch to engage in surveillance operations 
against the American people, had come full circle and had enhanced the 
surveillance capabilities of the federal government to an unprecedented de-
gree. 
The 2008 amendments to FISA broadened the government’s authority 
to request blanket surveillance of large quantities of information. Before the 
2008 FISA amendments, the government had to obtain a warrant to collect 
electronic intelligence on communications between persons located in the 
United States and persons abroad.110 The application for the warrant had to 
identify the persons whose communications would be intercepted and show 
probable cause that they were agents of a foreign power as defined under 
FISA.111 Under the 2008 FISA amendments, however, the government is not 
required to identify the persons whose communications will be intercepted 
or to show that they are agents of a foreign power. Under  
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section 702(a) of the 2008 FISA amendments, the Attorney General and 
Director of National Intelligence “may authorize jointly, for a period of up 
to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of per-
sons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire 
foreign intelligence information.”112 The amendments also impose limita-
tions on collecting information. Section 702(b) of the 2008 FISA amend-
ments prohibits the “targeting” of persons located in the United States, of 
persons located abroad where the intent is to target persons located in the 
United States, of United States persons located abroad, and of communica-
tions that occur within the United States.113 Authorizations for the targeting 
of persons under section 702(a) must be consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment.114 
Judicial review of authorizations to acquire electronic communications 
under section 702(a) is limited. The application to the FISA Court need only 
state that the procedures to be implemented for the authorization satisfy the 
targeting and minimization procedures set forth in section 702 and the 
Fourth Amendment.115 The targeting procedures should be approved if they 
“ensure that an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to tar-
geting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” 
and “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which 
the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisi-
tion to be located in the United States.”116 The minimization procedures 
should be approved if they satisfy the requirements of FISA.117 As a result, 
under the FISA 2008 amendments, the government could conduct large-
scale surveillance activities collecting information about communications 
between persons in the United States and persons located overseas, provided 
it is the persons overseas who are being targeted and that minimization pro-
cedures to protect persons located in the United States are in place. By 2008, 
Congress had adopted great changes to FISA, which conferred upon the 
executive branch the ability to conduct large-scale activities with relatively 
little judicial supervision. The structure of the FISA Court itself further lim-
its the scope of judicial scrutiny of executive branch surveillance activities. 
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III. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 
The manner in which judges for the FISA Court are chosen circum-
vents the political process that makes judicial selection accountable to the 
public. The judges on the FISA Court are chosen by the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court.118 This selection procedure enables the Chief 
Justice to shape the court in accordance with his own preferences, not only 
as to personnel but also as to policy. The overwhelming majority of Chief 
Justice John Roberts’s appointees to the court were appointed to the federal 
bench by Republican presidents, and half of them are former executive 
branch employees.119 Roberts’s predecessors Burger and Rehnquist appoint-
ed fewer Republican-appointed judges and fewer former executive branch 
employees.120 Clearly, the method employed for selecting judges for the 
FISA Court does not provide any sort of public accountability. The method 
enables one person, not himself an elected official, to appoint judges to the 
court that reflect the Chief Justice’s policy preferences. There are no public 
hearings or debates about the merits of any appointees to the court. The ra-
tionale and basis for such appointments rests with the Chief Justice alone, 
who does not answer to any authority in the matter. 
The spare provisions for adversary proceedings before the FISA Court 
have had a perceptible impact on the quality of its product quite apart from 
the overwhelming approval of federal requests for surveillance, which have 
given the court the appearance, at least, of acting as a virtual rubber stamp 
for the executive branch. In an October 3, 2011 opinion of the court, re-
leased via a Freedom of Information Act request on August 21, 2013, the 
court stated that the NSA had “circumvented” the FISA statute to obtain 
domestic telephone and internet communications not appropriate for surveil-
lance activities under FISA.121 The court stated that it was “troubled that the 
government’s revelations regarding NSA’s acquisition of Internet Transac-
tions mark the third instance in less than three years in which the govern-
ment has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a 
major collection program.”122 The misrepresentations included claims about 
the scope of collection of internet communications which, contrary to previ-
ous government representations, included information about the names of 
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persons in internet transactions, and others included misrepresentations 
about the manner in which the NSA searched telephone call records it had 
obtained.123 As a result of these misrepresentations, the NSA had been per-
mitted by the court to collect and analyze data outside that permitted by 
FISA and the Fourth Amendment.124 In spite of these findings, the court 
approved the targeting and minimization procedures employed by the CIA, 
NSA, and FBI upon its analysis of changes in those procedures that are re-
dacted from the court’s opinion.125 As to the government’s collection of “in-
ternet transactions,” the court concluded that the NSA’s practices regarding 
the collection of multiple internet communications violated FISA section 
702 and the Fourth Amendment.126 
The court is comprised of eleven United States District judges, but the 
work of the court is handled by a single judge, as the judges rotate on a 
weekly basis.127 The court is assisted by staff attorneys who render an analy-
sis provided to the duty judge, who makes a preliminary decision communi-
cated to the government, which may request a hearing to challenge any 
modifications to its request.128 The duty judge may also set a hearing with 
the government to obtain additional information needed to make a decision 
on an application.129 Orders of the court may be appealed by the government 
or a provider to the FISA Court of Review.130 
The FISA Court and the FISA Court of Review have developed a body 
of secret law interpreting the FISA statute and the Fourth Amendment.131 
Secret law is alien to the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence and is 
inconsistent with the rule of law. The law “must have the capacity to guide 
people in their actions. Encompassed within this is the notion that law must 
be transparent (publicly available, knowable) and nonarbitrary. Secret rules, 
applied in secret, fail this criterion.”132 FISA and the United States Constitu-
tion are public documents, but their interpretation by these courts is con-
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cealed from the public, purportedly on grounds of national security.133 Only 
select orders and filings before the FISA courts are disclosed to the public, 
and these are redacted to protect national security information from disclo-
sure. A judge who authors an opinion or order for the court may publish it 
sua sponte or by a party’s motion for release of the order or opinion.134 The 
judge may also permit the government to review and redact the opinion or 
order before it is published.135 The presiding judge of the court or the gov-
ernment may release orders and opinions of the court to Congress.136 In re-
leasing decisions and records to the public or to Congress, the court is bound 
by Executive Order 13526,137 which sets forth procedures for classifying 
national security information.138 
A basic function of the law is to put persons on notice of what is re-
quired of them and of how the government will treat them. Thus, as Lon 
Fuller argued, promulgation to the public is a key feature of a just legal sys-
tem: 
The laws should also be given adequate publication so that they may be 
subject to public criticism, including the criticism that they are the kind 
of laws that ought not to be enacted unless their content can be effective-
ly conveyed to those subject to them. It is also plain that if the laws are 
not made readily available, there is no check against a disregard of them 
by those charged with their application and enforcement.
139
 
Publicity is such a key feature of any legal system that its absence calls into 
question the legal validity of the system itself, and the deterioration of this 
condition signifies the deterioration of the legal system featuring secret 
laws.140 Publicity or promulgation is a feature of the rule of law, as is the 
law’s being clear and understandable and that those to whom the law will be 
applied having notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the law is ap-
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plied to them.141 To the extent that laws within a legal system do not have 
these features, the rule of law and the legitimacy of the system deteriorate.142 
Prior to the amendments in 2001 and 2008, the FISA Court had been 
limited to considering requests for specific warrants for electronic surveil-
lance.143 United States District Judge James Robertson, formerly a member 
of the FISA Court, has publicly criticized the use to which the FISA 
amendments have permitted the government to put the court. The court, he 
stated, “has turned into something like an administrative agency,” and “the 
court is now approving programmatic surveillance. I don’t think that is a 
judicial function.”144 Judge Robertson resigned from the court in 2005 after 
news reports showed the Bush administration was conducting extensive 
wiretaps without warrants or approval from the FISA Court.145 The limited 
nature of judicial review of applications to acquire information under 50 
U.S.C. § 1881a and 50 U.S.C. § 1861 suggests that Judge Robertson’s ob-
servations about the function of the FISA Court are well-taken. 
The FISA Court does not conduct an individualized review of the gov-
ernment’s acquisition of the electronic communications of any particular 
person.146 Instead, the court reviews the relevance of such communications 
sought to be obtained pursuant to the very broad scope of records reasonably 
believed to be related to the conduct of foreign affairs and national security 
interests of the United States, where these relate to the activities of foreign 
powers or their agents. The court’s inquiry under the broad reach of FISA 
amounts to a review of administrative procedures to be implemented by the 
government to acquire information. The FISA Court of Review has express-
ly held that there is a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement where “surveillance is conducted to obtain for-
eign intelligence for national security purposes and is directed against for-
eign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be located 
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outside the United States.”147 Where the government’s targeting and mini-
mization procedures satisfy FISA and “a significant purpose of a surveil-
lance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,” and the relevant execu-
tive branch authorities authorized by FISA to apply for surveillance orders 
have made the required certifications to the court, an application for acquir-
ing electronic communications satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-
bleness requirement.148 In essence, the court reviews administrative proce-
dures to be implemented by the government. The court reviews the minimi-
zation procedures the government will implement to limit dissemination and 
retention of communications and records obtained under FISA, which in-
deed is simply a review of a government administrative procedure.149 The 
USA FREEDOM Act amendments do not change this in a significant way. 
They do require the government to show that it seeks to employ a specific 
selection term that is relevant to an investigation of international terror-
ism.150 Such a term is one that the government would presumably use to 
search the massive databases of information that the government had ob-
tained through Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.151 The real differ-
ence after the adoption of the USA FREEDOM Act is the location of the 
information the government will search, not the information the government 
will search. 
The lack of an adversary procedure has rendered the court less capable 
of addressing as well as possible the complex constitutional and statutory 
questions surrounding the government’s large-scale acquisition of electronic 
communications and information regarding such communications. It is im-
portant that the FISA courts are developing legal doctrines such as the for-
eign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement in non-adversarial 
proceedings in which the only party is the government. In the Anglo-
American system of justice, the adversary system has proven a means by 
which courts are afforded the benefit of hearing the best arguments that two 
opposing sides in a dispute can offer on their own behalf and against each 
other’s. In the absence of adversary proceedings, the FISA courts hear from 
the government only and not from parties who contend the government’s 
powers to conduct surveillance operations on the American people should 
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be more limited than we have learned they are only recently. Under these 
conditions, it is hardly surprising that the FISA Court’s decisions over-
whelmingly approve government requests for surveillance, and it is likewise 
unsurprising that the FISA courts have generally approved what became a 
massive intelligence-gathering operation by the government, in which the 
government scooped up millions of communications and records of commu-
nications of Americans. 
Some of the weaknesses of the regime established in 1978 by FISA lay 
in the idea that there needed to be a separate set of courts to address ques-
tions under the statute. In United States v. United States District Court 
(Keith), the Supreme Court held that the government was obliged under the 
Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance on 
persons who plotted to bomb a CIA office in Michigan, where all the con-
spirators were Americans.152 The Keith Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the needs of domestic surveillance supported an exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: 
We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal security 
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regu-
larly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason 
to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending 
of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly courts can 
recognize that domestic security surveillance involves different consid-
erations from the surveillance of “ordinary crime.” If the threat is too 
subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its 
significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause 
for surveillance. 
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture the secrecy es-
sential to official intelligence gathering. The investigation of criminal ac-
tivity has long involved imparting sensitive information to judicial offic-
ers who have respected the confidentialities involved. Judges may be 
counted upon to be especially conscious of security requirements in na-
tional security cases. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary in 
connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage, and treason, §§ 
2516 (1)(a) and (c), each of which may involve domestic as well as for-
eign security threats. Moreover, a warrant application involves no public 
or adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a magistrate or 
judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may 
pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to 
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The reasoning in Keith applies to the conduct of electronic intelligence 
under FISA. Federal courts are capable of handling sensitive information 
and deciding cases where information has been sealed to protect its confi-
dentiality. Consideration of FISA applications by United States District 
judges, not of one court only, but of multiple courts reflecting the diversity 
of the federal judiciary, developing the law in a transparent manner so that 
there is no secret law as a matter of course and not by discretionary deci-
sions of the executive branch (as under the USA FREEDOM Act) would 
make the judiciary a more effective check on executive power than exists 
under FISA. 
The purpose of FISA and the establishment of the FISA courts was to 
impose legal and judicial checks on the ability of the executive branch to 
conduct surveillance activities and to store information obtained from 
them.154 The USA PATRIOT Act and amendments to the FISA statute in 
2007 and 2008 have been intended to enhance the power of the executive 
branch to conduct such activities, and they did so.155 The political situation 
that evolved from the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 made it easier for 
Congress to place more power in the hands of the executive branch to fight 
terrorism, and the weak form of judicial review exercised by the FISA 
courts, combined with the lack of transparency surrounding their decisions 
and operations, rendered them a very weak institutional check against the 
concentration of unmonitored power in the executive branch agencies that 
used FISA to conduct electronic intelligence gathering. This is destructive of 
the separation of powers and contributes to the general growth in the power 
of the executive branch. 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Throughout American history, national security threats have often 
prompted the exercise of unchecked power by the executive branch, often 
with congressional approval, and this includes the federal government’s 
response to the 9/11 attacks.156 The accumulation of power in the executive 
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branch brought on by the national security crisis made clear by the 9/11 at-
tacks is a real challenge to the separation of powers and the rule of law in 
the United States. Such power has been concentrated in the executive branch 
and its national security apparatus within the last decade that neither Con-
gress nor the courts can effectively check the continued growth of executive 
supremacy over domestic security. This concentration of power has contin-
ued, as the recent revelations in the press have made clear, as the executive 
branch develops further its ability to monitor the communications and ac-
tivities of Americans in the United States. The separation of powers princi-
ple, supported by the system of checks and balances in the United States 
Constitution, is the cornerstone of our system of government and was be-
lieved by the Constitution’s framers to be the bulwark of limited govern-
ment and individual liberty. It is this principle and idea that is degraded as 
the executive branch claims such independence from control and exercises 
such independence from control in fact, that legislative and judicial checks 
on executive power prove ineffectual and pose a genuine threat to the rule of 
law in the United States. 
The Framers regarded separation of powers as essential to limiting the 
overall power possessed by the national government and essential to the 
ability of the people to hold the government politically accountable for its 
decisions and actions.157 “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny.”158 Madison recognized that the doc-
trine of the separation of powers, taken over by the Framers of the United 
States Constitution and various state constitutions from Montesquieu,159 
Locke,160 and Blackstone,161 did not require a strict and total separation of 
authority among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, but rather 
a separation of function among them, so that none might usurp the authority 
entrusted to another. On the contrary, each of the different branches must be 
authorized to check the powers of the others by mechanisms involving each 
in the operations of the other two in order to preserve the separation of pow-
ers: “unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to 
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each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which 
the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice 
be duly maintained.”162 The separation of powers thus rests ultimately on the 
checks and balances: “but in which the powers of government should be so 
divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one 
could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and 
restrained by the others.”163 The Framers of the United States Constitution 
“laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judici-
ary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should 
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. But no bar-
rier was provided between these several powers.”164 A plain constitutional 
statement that the powers of each branch should be inviolate is insufficient 
to preserve the separation of powers in fact. That is, “a mere demarcation on 
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a 
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical con-
centration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”165 Checks 
and balances among the different branches are needed to preserve the sepa-
ration of powers and prevent the accumulation of power in one institution of 
government: 
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of 
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human af-
fairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the 
subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide 
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a 
check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be 
less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
166
 
The key to preserving the separation of powers is that each branch of gov-
ernment is able to limit the power of the other two branches. 
The development of the surveillance apparatus in the executive branch 
has undermined the separation of powers. It has undermined congressional 
oversight of the implementation of laws the Congress has enacted to impose 
limits on the conduct of surveillance activities by the executive branch. 
While Congress adopted FISA to check the ability of the executive branch 
to conduct surveillance operations,167 surveillance operations have expanded 
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dramatically since 9/11.168 Congress adopted FISA in part because the exec-
utive branch failed to provide Congress with the information Congress 
needed to make decisions about the propriety of surveillance activities.169 
But Congress has subsequently adopted laws, such as the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the 2008 amendments to FISA, that have given the executive branch 
carte blanche to gather information about United States persons, provided 
the “target” is some foreign power or agent thereof. In its haste to do some-
thing to protect Americans from further terrorist attacks after 9/11, Congress 
has given away the store to the executive branch. 
The development of surveillance activities in the executive branch has 
undermined judicial control over the executive branch. This has happened in 
part because the surveillance courts have become a rubber stamp for the 
executive branch. From 1979 through 2012, the government requested 
35,537 orders for surveillance under FISA, and the FISA Court approved 
35,530 such requests.170 In that same period, the court rejected only twelve 
government requests for surveillance.171 The court never rejected any gov-
ernment request for surveillance until 2003.172 Judge Reggie Walton, former 
presiding judge of the FISA Court, has stated that the number of FISA re-
quests approved by the court does not indicate that the court acts as a rubber 
stamp for the executive branch: 
The perception that the court is a rubber stamp is absolutely false. . . . 
There is a rigorous review process of applications submitted by the ex-
ecutive branch, spearheaded initially by five judicial branch lawyers who 
are national security experts and then by the judges, to ensure that the 




Of the 1588 applications for FISA surveillance the government presented to 
the FISA Court in 2013, for example, the FISA Court modified only thirty-
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The approval rate for FISA surveillance requests is not conclusive evi-
dence that the FISA Court has given carte blanche to the executive branch to 
conduct surveillance operations that sweep up millions of communications 
by Americans into government databases. The approval rates for federal 
wiretaps in ordinary criminal investigations also have very high approval 
rates.175 What created the rubber stamp was Congress, which adopted 
amendments to FISA that fundamentally altered the manner in which the 
FISA Court would examine requests for surveillance under FISA. 
As a result, the very limited review that the FISA Court exercises over 
government requests for surveillance imposes only a minimal check on the 
exercise of executive power under FISA. This very limited review has ena-
bled executive branch officials to claim that their surveillance activities are 
approved by the courts.176 The stamp of judicial approval has served to en-
hance executive power with little judicial supervision of executive acts. 
Hamilton warned of the threat presented where the judiciary, as the “weak-
est” branch, would become subservient to executive branch interests: 
[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would 
have everything to fear from its union with either of the other depart-
ments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a depend-
ence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent 
separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in 
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-
ordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its 
firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may 
therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitu-




It is arguable that the judiciary has been “captured” by the executive 
branch through FISA and the FISA courts. When the FISA Court stated that 
the government had misrepresented important facts about its surveillance 
activities to the court on numerous occasions, there is no hint that the court 
imposed any sanction on the government for its misconduct.178 Any practic-
ing lawyer would be amazed at the FISA Court’s tolerance of such miscon-
duct. 
 
Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 834–35 
(2014) (arguing that high approval rate evidences weak oversight). 
 175. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT 2012, TABLE 7: AUTHORIZED 
INTERCEPTS GRANTED PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2519 AS REPORTED IN WIRETAP REPORTS FOR 
CALENDAR YEARS 2002–2012, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/
2012/Table7.pdf. 
 176. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzalez, supra note 105, at 17.  
 177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 178. See Case Name Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. 2011). 
2015] FISA AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 61 
The rule of law is built into our constitutional system through the sepa-
ration of powers and checks and balances. It is these central features of our 
system of government that are designed to promote, though not guarantee, 
that power is exercised in accordance with law. When its historical advo-
cates refer to the tyranny that results from the accumulation of power in the 
hands of one institution of government, they mean government by the will 
of one institution unchecked by law.179 The rule of law is not an end in itself, 
but is instead a means to see that power is exercised by government in a 
manner that promotes the shared interests of the political community rather 
than promoting the interests of one section of that community to the detri-
ment of others. It appears in Western thought first in Aristotle’s Politics 
expressly for this function.180 When Aristotle argued that the best form of 
political community is one in which power is shared by different social clas-
ses and governed by law, he established the line of thought that grew into 
modern constitutionalism.181 When Montesquieu, Blackstone, Madison, and 
others write in support of the separation of powers principle, they continue 
the thought that to be limited by law, power should be shared and checked 
by competing interests. The alternative, they argue, is power concentrated in 
one institution, which, as Madison suggested, “is the very definition of tyr-
anny.”182 
The separation of powers demands that there be effective judicial and 
legislative checks on the exercise of executive power, but the structure of 
the regime for electronic surveillance and intelligence gathering under FISA 
fails to establish such checks. The statute gives courts very limited control 
over the conduct of the executive branch agencies responsible for these pro-
grams, and Congress, due to understandable concerns over national security 
threats, has not insisted on extensive monitoring or control over these agen-
cies. In fact, as I have shown here, Congress has acquiesced in executive 
branch demands for very limited monitoring over its intelligence-gathering 
programs. FISA and the amendments to the statute over the last fifteen years 
have contributed to the concentration of power in the executive branch and, 
therefore, to the degradation of the separation of powers in our system of 
government. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Changing technology and new threats, perceived or real, gave rise to 
governmental intelligence-gathering activities that prompted Congress to 
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adopt FISA in 1978 in an effort to impose legal and institutional checks on 
the power of the executive branch agencies responsible for such programs. 
Further changes in technology and new security threats prompted Congress 
to amend FISA to give these agencies more authority and latitude to 
strengthen national security through electronic surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, which resulted in a largely unregulated exercise of such power by 
the mid-2000s. Congress responded by giving these agencies still more au-
thority, until public disclosures of abuses led to calls for reform by 2013. 
This narrative parallels the historic trend of growth and concentration of 
power in the federal government generally and in the executive branch 
thereof in particular. Congress understandably does not want to be accused 
of failing to protect the public against another 9/11 style terror attack, but 
Congress has not served our system of government well because it has failed 
to establish an effective judicial check on executive power under FISA. The 
separation of powers is a core principle of American government, and FISA 
has contributed to its deterioration. 
